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Abstract
In this article, we have undertaken an exploratory analysis of the extrinsic and intrinsic factors affecting
an employer’s safety motivation in the construction industry, and their correlation with firm size,
management level, and perceived risk. We have employed a model based on previous research by
Michael Wright for the Health and Safety Executive (UK). Methods: A sample of managers from 198
construction firms in Catalonia (Spain) were interviewed collecting relevant data. The exploratory
factor analysis of this data detected two factors: extrinsic (prosecution, inspection, external pressure)
and intrinsic (legal, responsibility, internal involvement). Confirmatory factor analysis did not rule
out the presence of extrinsic and intrinsic factors (Wright), and the analysis with covariates (MIMIC
model) showed significant positive relationships between extrinsic factors, management level, and
perceived risk. It also showed a significant positive relationship between intrinsic factors and firm
size. Conclusion: The aim of this study was to make a preliminary diagnostic of an employer’s safety
motivation. Our findings indicate that it is possible to develop external motivators (advice from
inspection bodies, union activities, publicity of prosecution records, etc.) that are addressed to top
managers and to firms more exposed to risk. We have also found that it is possible to develop internal
motivators by introducing experience modification ratings, social accounting, advertising in the mass
media, and promotion campaigns, particularly among bigger firms. Our findings will be useful to
government agencies, company managers, and consultants and may be adapted for use in motivating
midlevel staff to adopt participatory intervention programs. C© 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
1. INTRODUCTION
Article 5 of Council Directive 89/391/EEC on the in-
troduction of measures to encourage improvements in
the safety and health of workers at work states that the
employer must ensure the health and safety of workers
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in all aspects of work. Therefore, business owners and
managers must be involved in the design and applica-
tion of preventive actions—a requirement that seems
to be (at least from a media standpoint) as difficult for
companies at the beginning of the 21st century as it was
for companies a century earlier. Accounts by Barstow
and Lowell for theNewYork Times (The Pulitzer Prizes,
2004) reveal the same corporate disinterest in worker
health and safety that Taylor and Fayol observed at the
beginning of the 20th century.
It is likely that this situation is the result of improve-
ments over the past century in physical conditions (ma-
chinery and facilities), changes in how work is orga-
nized (Robbins, 2004), or the greater importance of
the service sector relative to the primary and industrial
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sectors. But motivation as a factor in prevention does
not appear in mainstream research on preventive man-
agement (Shannon, Mayr, & Haines, 1997; Shannon,
Robson, & Sale, 2001; Zohar, 2002), although from a
legal, scientific, and practical standpoint (spurred by
social agents) emphasis is placed on the need for a
preventive culture based on corporate management’s
motivation and commitment to integrating risk pre-
vention into overall corporate policymaking.
Many studies deal with risk prevention from a
legal standpoint (Viscusi, 1986; M. Wright, 1998),
from an economic standpoint (Bird & Germain, 1986;
Dorman, 2000; Gil Fisa & Pujol Senovilla, 2000),
and from an organizational standpoint (Hale, 2003;
Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Perrow, 1967; Reason,
1997; Terre´s de Ercilla, Mondelo, A´lvarez Casado, &
Talavera Pedrol, 2002; Zohar, 2002). Few studies, how-
ever (Smallman, 2001), analyze in a comprehensive
manner factors motivating business owners and man-
agers to adopt risk prevention measures.
In the scientific literature, safety motivation has
been partially studied by Hofmann, Jacobs, and Landy
(1995), by Smallman (2001), and by Rundmo and Hale
(2003). Hofmann and Smallman’s works are largely a
synthesis of the previous literature to date.
However, Rundmo and Hale employed a scientific
approach based on psychological theories of reasoned
and planned action and behavior (Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen
& Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), using a
structural equation model applied to a sample group
of 210 managers from the company Norsk Hydro to
analyze the relationship between attitudes and inten-
tions of behavior toward safety and its relationship to
self-declared behavior. The approach used by the au-
thors is supported by the theory, but to be useful, it
is important that the constructs (multidimensional in
character) are homogeneous within the unit of analysis.
This is possible when the managers are from the same
company but is difficult to justify when the contexts
are heterogeneous (Wallace & Ross, 2006).
Furthermore, a number of official bodies have fi-
nanced exploratory research on corporate manager
motivation in the geographic areas under their juris-
diction. Among the most interesting of these studies
were those carried out in the United Kingdom and in
Australia.
In the United Kingdom, the Health and Safety Ex-
ecutive has been undertaking research in this field for
years, both from a qualitative and quantitative perspec-
tive (through surveys), specifically in published studies
by Michael Wright (1998), Michael Wright and Sara
Marsden (2002, 2005), Tony Wright (2000), Haefeli,1
Haslam, and Haslam (2005), and Miller2 and Haslam
(2009). In Australia, the National Occupational Health
and Safety Commission commissioned a qualitative
study (Gunningham, 1999) and, on the basis of this
study, carried out a survey to analyze quantitatively the
proposed relationships.
Wright studied the factors that favor prevention
management, understood as being either proactive or
reactive. Proactive management “implies undertaking
actions beforehand, or in the absence of any gov-
ernmental monitoring action, such as an inspection,
prohibition, or warning” (M. Wright, 1998, p. 3). In
these cases, one finds that the proactive response varies
widely among companies: there are those that comply
fully with the law (abide by the letter of the law); those
that go beyond the law; those that act in response to
demands not required by law; and finally those that act
in the absence of external factors. By contrast, reactive
management refers to taking action only after receiving
warnings, instructions, or sanctions.
In looking for motivating factors, M. Wright dis-
tinguishes between intrinsic factors—those depending
solely on the organization (cost reduction, ethical con-
siderations, raising morale and productivity, or im-
proving internal organization)—and extrinsic factors
related to the organization’s surrounding environment,
including compliance with legislation (for reasons of
principle; fear of sanctions); negative publicity; clients,
suppliers, unions, or other pressure group demands;
or to avoid eventual litigation.
On the basis of the above definitions, M. Wright
has designed a model (Table 1) for analyzing moti-
vation for preventive actions, in which the size of an
TABLE 1. Wright Model (1998)
Perception of Risk
Size Low High
Large Moderate
extrinsic
motivation
High intrinsic
motivation
Small Low intrinsic or
extrinsic
motivation
Moderate
intrinsic
motivation
Note: Original table based on Wright diagram (1998).
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organization and perceived risk are identified as signif-
icant factors. According to this model, company size
facilitates extrinsic motivation, and greater perceived
risk facilitates intrinsic motivation. There is a posi-
tive relationship between size and perceived risk: when
both are high, intrinsic factors acquire greater impor-
tance. On the other extreme, in small organizations
with low perceived risk, both factor types—intrinsic
and extrinsic—are less operative. Companies occupy
the intermediate points of the model where intrinsic
and extrinsic factors operate alternatively and, in a less
dramatic fashion, depending on company size and per-
ceived risk. In these relationships, corporate manage-
ment’s experience in major accidents or disasters and
knowledge in risk prevention act as positive modera-
tors (toward greater intrinsic motivation), while a poor
preventive culture, high costs of preventive measures,
and shortage of adequate solutions are negative mod-
erators. Other issues considered in his model are the
interactions between motivation and the firm’s supply
elasticity and/or the firm’s demand elasticity, which de-
pend on whether demand or supply is stimulated by
clients, suppliers, authorities, circumstances, and ex-
perience of major disasters. On the basis of this model,
Wright proposed that authorities vary regulatory and
promotion measures accordingly (Table 2). In the case
of regulations, authorities may wish to promote self-
regulation (for example, promoting and overseeing im-
plementation of risk prevention management systems)
or prescription (defining more concretely the measures
to be adopted and overseeing their compliance). Au-
thorities may wish to use persuasive promotion (by way
of ongoing dialogue and negotiation) or compulsory
promotion (imposing concrete behavioral guidelines).
In companies where intrinsic factors play a more sig-
nificant role, Wright suggests a greater emphasis on
TABLE 2. Wright Model (1998), Proposed Actions
Prevention Promotion
Regulations Compulsion Persuasion
Self-Regulation Moderate
motivation
High intrinsic
motivation
Prescription Low intrinsic or
extrinsic
motivation
Moderate
motivation
Note: Original table based on Wright diagram (1998).
self-regulation and persuasive promotion, while in or-
ganizations where both motivating factors are fairly
weak, Wright proposes both prescriptive regulations
and compulsory promotion.
The work of Gunningham (1999) adds an additional
element to the Wright model, which distinguishes the
motivation of the executive management of large cor-
porations from the motivation of owners and supervi-
sors of small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs).
According to Gunningham, these two groups are
related in that executive managers of large corpora-
tions can influence SMB owners and managers through
the value chain by requiring certain minimal risk pre-
vention standards from their suppliers and service
providers. In both large and small companies, upper-
level management can influence their respective super-
visors (middle and lower management) in implement-
ing risk prevention measures. Motivating factors that
influence these three groups are the following:
1. Upper Management in Large Corporations and
Organizations: The main motivating factors be-
hind prevention are interrelated and include
degree of legal responsibility, risk of loss of
reputation and credibility, existence of possible
personal incentives (mainly economic), possi-
ble business/commercial benefits of improved
risk prevention management, and the presence
and knowledge of prevention management pro-
grams.
2. Owners and Managers of Small and Medium-
Sized Businesses: Main motivating factors for
risk prevention are legislation, official oversight,
supply chain pressure, information, and influ-
ence of intermediaries (providers, accountants,
insurance companies, auditors, and trade asso-
ciations).
3. Supervisors: Three factors motivate prevention:
training in occupational risk prevention, pres-
ence of an evaluation and reward system, and
presence of internal disciplinary measures de-
signed to guarantee compliance.
Using this albeit limited, but adequate, theoretical
framework, the following questions have been posed:
1. Are these motivating factors applicable in
a business context and in Catalonia in
particular?
2. Is there a relationship between the importance
of each of these factors and company size?
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3. Is there a relationship between the importance
of each factor and the position of the interlocu-
tor within the company?
4. Is there a relationship between the importance
of each factor and the perceived risk?
Finally, could this information be used to design
a motivation strategy adapted to the aforementioned
parameters of company size, position in company hi-
erarchy of surveyed person, and perceived risk?
2. METHODOLOGY
In an attempt to answer these questions, a series of tele-
phone interviews were conducted with top-level man-
agers and businesspeople in the construction sector.
In addition, information was simultaneously gathered
from a structured questionnaire (details of fieldwork
can be found in Herna´ndez Mateu, 2004).
Sample selection was done among construction
companies that were based in Barcelona and were reg-
istered in the SABI database (Bureau van Dijk Elec-
tronic Publishing)—a total of 2,236 companies at the
time the database was queried. Initially, the selection
was based on stratified random sampling according to
company size. However, because of the low rate of re-
sponse (around 8%), sample selection was completed
using companies contacted directly through trade as-
sociations. The final sample included 198 companies.
In all these companies, the top executive was con-
tacted first, and information on the company’s risk
prevention policies was requested. In 41 companies,
the top executive or manager (owner, president, or
general director) provided the information, while
the responsibility of providing the information was
delegated to other company personnel (61 upper-
level and 96 midlevel managers) in the remaining
companies.
With respect to company size, 58 companies (29.3%
of total) employ between 1 and 10 salaried employ-
ees (micro-companies), 81 (40.9%) employ up to
50 salaried employees (small company), 41 (20.7%)
have up to 250 employees (medium-sized company),
and 18 (9.1%) have more than 251 salaried employees.
Each interviewee was asked about safety in his or
her company in comparison with competitors (Do you
think your company is more or less safe than your com-
petitors?), specific facts about work-related injuries, as
well as spot-checks and inspections by the company
in the last 12 months. We found that 140 companies
(70% of total) had experienced in the past year 2,306
minor accidents, 38 companies (19.2%) had had seri-
ous accidents, and 4 companies had had fatal accidents.
The interview findings by company size are presented
in Table 3.
Finally, each interviewee was asked to evaluate his
or her behavior/performance in risk prevention (see
Table 4, using a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from
“strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”).
Statistical analysis of data was carried out in three
phases. In the first phase, an exploratory factor analysis
was done on items included in Table 4 (see, for example,
Costello & Osborne, 2005, for description on using this
technique). In the second phase, a two-part confirma-
tory factor analysis was performed (Jo¨reskog, 1969),
establishing in the first part an unrestricted model, in
order to get tests for significance, and in the second
part, a simplified model obtained by restricting the
significant relationships. The third and final phase was
devoted to the analysis of covariates regarding inter-
viewee’s position in the company, company size, and
the interviewee’s perception of safety at his or her com-
pany compared with competing firms, using a MIMIC
model (Jo¨reskog & Goldberger, 1975; Bollen, 1989). In
all cases, diagonally weighted least squares estimators
were used (Muthe´n, du Toit, & Spisic, 1997), together
TABLE 3. Experience of Accidents, Inspections, and Spot-Checks by Technical Officers
Micro Small Medium Large Total Affected
Minor Accidents 45 232 405 1.624 2.306 140
Serious Accidents 6 9 23 14 52 38
Fatal Accident 0 0 2 2 4 4
No. of Inspections TSS 42 148 242 230 662 129
No. of Spot-Checks CSCS 19 67 116 61 263 76
Note: The last column shows number of companies that have experienced each event.
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TABLE 4. Question Regarding Risk Prevention Behavior/Performance: “In general, which of the following statements best
describes your risk prevention behavior/performance?”
Item Text
amesanj I do not act unless threatened with a sanction or judicial/legal action.
recomit I wait until government inspectors or technicians give me precise orders or instructions.
legisla I strictly abide by legal provisions.
masqley I take action beyond that required by the law.
demext I act in response to external demands or requests (trade unions, clients, etc.).
sinpres I act independently of any type of governmental or external pressure.
with Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommended criteria
for goodness of fit.
3. FINDINGS
Figure 1 shows the Scree diagram of the exploratory fac-
tor analysis. In this diagram, one observes a significant
level of change between the eigenvalues corresponding
to the solution with two and three factors, indicating
the appropriateness of the two-factor solution accord-
ing to Scree criteria. Furthermore, these two eigenval-
ues, 2.038 and 1.698, are both greater than 1, while the
third is less than 1 (0.764), indicating once again the
appropriateness the two-factor solution according to
Kaiser’s criteria.
With regard to the exploratory model results (Ta-
ble 5, columns 1 and 2, under “Exploratory” heading),
larger loadings in the first factor correspond to items
amesanj, recommit, and demext elements, allowing one
to identify the first factor as extrinsic motivation. In
the second factor, by contrast, the greater loadings cor-
respond to items legisla, masqley, sinpres, allowing one
to identify this second factor as intrinsic motivation.
The adjustment of the model can be considered perfect
Figure 1 Scree diagram of exploratory factor analysis.
according to the chi-squared test, χ2(4) = 2.907; p =
0.5731 and the rest of the adjustment indicators.
Performing an unrestricted confirmatory factor
analysis requires setting four parameters. The first two
parameters are derived from the standardization of
both factors, extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, by fix-
ing the variance of each at a value of one. The third
parameter is established by setting the loading of the
recommit item at zero in the second factor (intrinsic
motivation), and the last parameter comes from setting
at zero the loading of the sinpres item on the first factor
(extrinsic motivation). The only important variations
from the exploratory analysis (Table 5, “Unrestricted
Confirmatory”) are the significant weight of the leg-
isla item on the first factor (extrinsic motivation, with
a loading equal to 0.227; standard error, SE = 0.073),
and that the factors show no significant correlation
(−0.104; SE= 0.082). As in the earlier case, the adjust-
ment indicators show a perfect adjustment: the chi-
square test coincides by design with the exploratory
analysis, and the remaining indicators are below limit
values. The model confirms a structure with two fac-
tors and provides standard errors that can be later used
for its simplification into a final measuring model.
The final confirmatory factor analysis was done by
setting at zero the insignificant relationships obtained
in the previous analysis (Table 5, “Confirmatory”). The
adjustment indicators again show a perfect adjustment:
with a chi-square test, χ2(6) = 4.444; p = 0.6167, and
the remaining indicators are once again below their
limit values. Furthermore, this model is a restricted
version of the earlier model, so one may use Satorra’s
procedure (2000) to compare both models. The result
of the Satorra test is a chi-square test with 4 degrees of
freedom,χ2(4)=3.002;p =0.5569, indicating that the
restrictions do not significantly distort the adjustment
of the model.
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TABLE 5. Findings of Measurement Models (phases 1 and 2)
Exploratory Unrestricted confirmatory Confirmatory
Item 1 2 Extrinsic Intrinsic Extrinsic Intrinsic
amesanj 0.686 −0.046 0.685 −0.002 0.688
0.080 0.071 0.080
recomit 0.907 −0.059 0.905 0.000 0.897
0.097 0.000 0.096
legisla 0.177 0.455 0.227 0.469 0.189 0.440
0.073 0.096 0.066 0.091
masqley −0.048 0.518 0.007 0.517 0.512
0.073 0.086 0.091
demext 0.524 0.045 0.531 0.080 0.528
0.047 0.073 0.047
sinpres −0.091 0.847 0.000 0.846 0.858
0.000 0.111 0.121
Pro memoria:
Correlation 0.068 −0.104
0.082
Adjustment χ2(4) 2.907 χ2(4) 2.907 χ2(6) 4.444
RMSEA 0.000 0.000 0.000
SRMR 0.021 0.018 0.032
WRMR — 0.318 0.605
Note: Significant values appear in bold. Standard errors appear in italics.
Finally, the measuring model obtained considers two
factors:
1. Extrinsic motivation for risk prevention, which
comprise four items: 1) threat of sanction (ame-
sanj), 2) advice and recommendations from in-
spectors and technicians (recomit), 3) strict ad-
herence to legal provisions (legisla), and 4) act-
ing in response to external demands (demext).
2. Intrinsic motivation for risk prevention, which
comprises three items: 1) strict adherence to
legal provisions (legisla), 2) acting more rigor-
ously than required by the law (masqley), and 3)
acting in absence of external pressure (sinpres).
The two factors, extrinsic and intrinsic motivations,
share only one item, strict adherence to legal provisions
(legisla) and do not appear to be correlated.
Table 6 shows the findings of the factor analysis with
covariates, MIMIC model. One can observe that posi-
tion in the company hierarchy (position) and perceived
risk (risk) are positively and significantly related to
extrinsic motivation, while company size (size) is posi-
tively and significantly related to intrinsic motivation.
The remaining covariate relationships are insignificant.
Covariates predict a 23.6% variation in extrinsic moti-
vation, and an 18.7% variation in intrinsic motivation.
The adjustment diagnosis is perfect χ2(12) = 19.012;
p = 0.0882; RMSEA = 0.063 and WRMR = 0.690.
Figure 2 depicts the path diagram, in which only sig-
nificant trajectories have been drawn for the sake of
simplicity.
4. DISCUSSION
This article shows that it is possible to analyze method-
ically the safety motivation of employers. The con-
struct can be assessed by applying a sequence of factor
analysis, a well-known method developed by Joresko¨g,
followed by a confirmatory analysis to simplify the re-
sulting measurement. Furthermore, by employing a
multiple indicators–multiple causes model, it is pos-
sible to study factor correlates with relevant covari-
ates mentioned in previous descriptive works, such as
those by M. Wright (in the UK) and Gunningham (in
Australia).
6 Human Factors and Ergonomics in Manufacturing & Service Industries DOI: 10.1002/hfm
Terre´s, Castejo´n, and Mondelo Corporate Motivation to Risk Prevention
TABLE 6. Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) Model
Extrinsic Intrinsic
coeff. SE p-value s.coeff coeff. SE p-value s.coeff R2
Measurement
amesanj 0.671 0.088 0.000 0.719 0.517
recomit 0.870 0.094 0.000 0.896 0.803
demext 0.519 0.048 0.000 0.570 0.325
legisla 0.231 0.064 0.000 0.260 0.449 0.081 0.000 0.488 0.283
masqley 0.522 0.088 0.000 0.561 0.315
sinpres 0.734 0.089 0.000 0.768 0.590
Covariates
position 0.585 0.175 0.001 0.435 −0.020 0.189 0.917 −0.015
size 0.064 0.115 0.580 0.052 0.485 0.153 0.001 0.409
risk 0.301 0.074 0.000 0.438 −0.075 0.083 0.366 −0.113
Adjustment
Test of model fit χ2(12) = 19.012; p = 0.0882 Explained variances R2
RMSEA 0.063 Extrinsic factor 0.236
WRMR 0.690 Intrinsic factor 0.187
Note: Significant values appear in bold.
Figure 2 Path diagram—model with covariates.
4.1. Method of Data Collection
1. When evaluating the results of this work, keep
in mind that the unit of analysis used is “com-
panies” and not “workers.” In other words, the
results cannot be directly extrapolated to the
population of workers. The distribution of
companies in most industries and developed
countries (even in the United States, accord-
ing to the Bureau of Labor Business Dynam-
ics Employment Statistics) is highly skewed:
while most of the companies (85% and over)
are small, roughly half (45%) of the workers are
employed in big companies.
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2. A survey is used as method to collect data. Al-
though surveys are relatively cheap, particularly
when using phone or computers to assist in the
collection process, consider that the data come
from a self-reported study. In the process, every
interviewee was assured of the anonymity of the
data, and that the data would be used only for
research purposes.
3. Many of the results are context sensitive. Some
specific issues of this context are 1) that in Euro-
pean countries companies are legally enforced
by Council Directive 89/391/EEC on the in-
troduction of measures to encourage improve-
ments in the safety and health of workers at
work; 2) that even under the same general legis-
lation, there are different relevant nuances in the
transposition or instrumentation of the legisla-
tion among countries; and, 3) that all the com-
panies in this study belong to the construction
sector. Details on the measurements used are
given in the methodology section of this article,
to facilitate its use by researchers when analyz-
ing other contexts. The impact of the present
context on the results is discussed later.
4.2. Measurement
The exploratory factor analysis (see Figure 1, and
columns 1 and 2 of Table 5) confirm Wright’s work
with regard to the existence of two motivating fac-
tors for preventive action. Keeping previous research
nomenclature, these two factors have been named as
extrinsic motivators—related to the environment sur-
rounding the company (surveillance and control sys-
tem, threat of sanctions, pressure from trade unions,
legislation) and intrinsic motivators—that depend on
the company or organization (acting beyond the re-
quirements of the law in the absence of governmental
or external pressure).
These results agree with those of Wright and can
be interpreted similarly, depending on the employer’s
view on workers’ health and safety. On the one hand,
the employer may assign an organizational value to
occupational risks prevention in terms of improved
productivity and worker satisfaction. The employer
may take a moral view of the situation (given their
nature), which may lead the management to behave
ethically to prevent occupational risks (intrinsic mo-
tivation). Alternatively, the employer may think that
he is only obliged to comply with the law, postponing
any consideration to pressure groups closely related to
the company’s environment, such as unions, clients, or
government inspectors (extrinsic motivation).
Further analyses were used to get test results for the
parameters (by means of an unrestricted confirmatory
analysis, as showed in columns 3, and 4 of Table 5)
and to get a simplified model (using a restricted con-
firmatory analysis, shown in the last two columns of
Table 5). Significant results of these analyses are dis-
cussed next.
1. First, the extrinsic and intrinsic motivators were
not significantly correlated in our sample, with
a value of −0.104 (column 4 of Table 5, and
with a ratio estimate/standard error equal to
z = −1.272, p = 0.204). This result, which
departs from previous research, implies that a
company that exhibits high external motivation
not necessarily will exhibit high intrinsic moti-
vation, and vice versa.
This result is somehow counterintuitive, as
intuition could lead one to think that high in-
ternal motivation must imply more sensitive-
ness to external pressures. But this relationship
could be contemplated otherwise: a company
with high internal motivation to manage oc-
cupational risk prevention (ORP) could either
shape the way in which its clients or providers
manage ORP (through the value chain, as stated
by Gunninham); or could get labeled by unions
or governmental bodies as a company showing
“good preventive practices.” For both mecha-
nisms to operate, all that is needed is to find a
relationship between intrinsic motivation and
company size, as only bigger companies seem
able to shape their clients’ or providers’ way
to manage the ORP, and have enough visibility
to be labeled as a “good preventive practices”
company. This result will be verified when dis-
cussing the relationship between external mo-
tivation and company size.
2. The double loading of the legislation in both
factors. As it is shown in the last two columns of
Table 5, the legisla item has significant loadings
in both extrinsic motivation (loading = 0.189,
ratio to standard error, z = 2.854, p = 0.0043),
and intrinsic motivation (loading = 0.440, ra-
tio to standard error, z = 4.831, p = 0.000).
These results are to be expected under pro-
visions of the Council Directive 89/391/EEC,
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which requires the employers to systematically
manage the ORP (Frick, Langaa, Quinlan, &
Wilthagen, 2003), by implementing the general
principles of prevention (Article 2), and stating
that the employer shall “aim to improve existing
situations” (Article 6), giving support to intrin-
sic motivation; and remarking the need to take
in account workers participation (Article 11),
thus supporting extrinsic motivation.
While Wright, when discussing legal issues in the
UK, also mentions the need to systematically manage
ORP (he qualifies the British regulation as partially
mandated self-compliance/goal setting), he doesn’t
mention the other two sections of the legislation men-
tioned above, partly because of specific nuances3 in the
transposition of the directive, and partly because he
diminishes the legal argument, given that “the proba-
bility of a visit by the HSE is likely to be perceived as too
low to have a major influence on site practice. If poor
practices are detected the financial or other penalties
are insufficient to deter (M. Wright, 1998, p. 82).
In Spain, the improvement of working conditions is
explicitly included in the legislation (as in the majority
of the European Union Countries), as an obligation not
only for the administrative bodies with responsibilities
in ORP but also of the companies’ participatory com-
mittees. And while the probability of an inspection is,
generally speaking, “low,”4 the construction industry
receives an extra effort, so in our sample, the expected5
yearly rate of having an inspection or spot-check is, for
micro-companies 1.1 [0.50; 2.19], for small compa-
nies 2.7 [2.10; 3.35], for medium companies 8.7 [6.32;
12.07], and for large companies 16.2 [6.85; 38.18]. It is
also important to note that the visibility of the business
prevention activities is high, as one can easily observe
many of them from the street (for example, the stabil-
ity of a scaffold or the protective equipment carried on
by the workers). On the other hand, unions’ presence
is facilitated, even in small construction sites, due to
the figure of “zonal delegates” (unions’ ORP experts
with a geographical adscription) that can activate and
impulse participatory mechanisms.
4.3. Model With Covariates
Our final model analyzes the impact of three covariates:
1) the position of the interviewee in the company hier-
archy (position, a three-level variable), 2) perceived risk
(risk, using a seven-level variable, ranking the perceived
incidence of accidents), and 3) company size (size, a
four-level variable). One of the relevant findings from
this analysis (see Table 6) is that the measurement part
of the model fully agrees with that obtained in previous
models, in terms of significance and relative strength of
the factor loadings. Thus, previous discussion on the
details of this structure is fully applicable.
Our most salient results regarding covariate relation-
ships are discussed nextg (numeric coefficients between
parentheses are standardized coefficients and p-values,
as shown in Table 6):
1. Size: As previously observed in studies by
Wright (1998) and Gunninham (1999), com-
pany size is positively correlated to degree of
intrinsic motivation (SC = 0.409; p = 0.001).
However, there is not a significant relationship
between size and degree of extrinsic motivation
(SC = 0.052; p = 0.064).
The significant relationship between size and
intrinsic motivation might be explained as in
previous research, as a result of the fear of loss
of credibility, but, in the construction sector,
even in the worst cases, the equity and busi-
ness risks associated with these accidents is rel-
atively small, and it is also lowers the risk of los-
ing credibility or damaging image.6 So, in the
context of the present research, this significant
relationship could be attributed to the legal dis-
positions of the European Directive, that have
been qualified as better suited for large business
(Frick et al., 2003). Indeed, 18 years after the ap-
proval of the directive, the Council Resolution
on a new community strategy on health and
safety at work for 2007–2012 (2007/C 145/01)
includes as first area of action for the European
countries, to implement “a package of instru-
ments which guarantee a high level of compli-
ance with the legislation, in particular in small
and medium enterprises (SMEs) and high-risk
sectors,”7 underscoring the inadequacies of the
existing legislation regarding SMEs.
The nonsignificant relationship between size
and degree of extrinsic motivation is expected,
given the significant relationship between size
and intrinsic motivation, in the same terms used
to discuss the results of the measurement mod-
els: both relationships are seemingly the con-
sequence of the two mechanisms described in
previous section B.1 acting together.
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2. Interviewees’ position within company hierar-
chy: position correlates significantly and posi-
tively with degree of extrinsic motivation (SC
= 0.435; p = 0.001). However, there is no sig-
nificant relationship between position in com-
pany and degree of intrinsic motivation (SC =
−0.015; p = 0.917).
The first relationship, position correlation
with extrinsic motivation, could be explained by
taking into account that external relationships
typically lie among the direct or directly super-
vised responsibilities of top management and
owners, making them more motivated by the
external pressures from the value chain, unions,
and inspections (and the possibility of prosecu-
tion or fines).
Several factors might contribute to the ab-
sence of correlation between position and in-
trinsic motivation. For example, it can be
partially explained by taking into account the
aforementioned (see previous point 1) lower
risk of losing credibility or damaging business
image, and hence threatening stakeholder con-
fidence. Additionally, it could also be the re-
sult of a lack of commercial benefit from ORP
management, as Wright also mentioned for the
United Kingdom and Norway, quite opposite to
what happens in the United States, where expe-
rience rating could make the difference between
profit and loses, particularly in the construction
industry. Although a financial argument might
also play an important role in some European
countries (Finland, France, Germany, Italy, and
Luxembourg), where there is an adjustment
between insurance premiums and cash bene-
fit from the costs issued by mutual insurance
companies for workplace accidents and work-
related illnesses.8 Such an experience rate sys-
tem did not exist in Spain, until very recently.9
3. Degree of risk perception: risk correlates posi-
tively and significantly with degree of extrinsic
motivation (SC = 0.438; p = 0.000). However,
contrary to Wright, this study finds no signifi-
cant correlation between perceived risk and de-
gree of intrinsic motivation (SC= −0.113; p =
0.366).
As previously mentioned, catastrophic oc-
cupational accidents are extremely rare in the
construction sector, and hence, there is a low
risk of losing credibility or damaging the com-
pany’s image, and there is also a lack of financial
incentive. Since those are the fundamental
mechanisms behind intrinsic motivation, the
nonsignificant correlation between risk and in-
trinsic motivation is perhaps not surprising.
In the absence of a direct relationship be-
tween risk and intrinsic motivation, risk makes
companies more aware of external pressures, as
having a serious or fatal accident leads, auto-
matically to one or more inspections. Risk can
also more easily be the subject of union com-
plaints, which explains the significant correla-
tion between risk and external motivation.
4.4. Strategies to Improve Motivation
to ORP Management
Our findings may be useful for designing motivation
strategies aimed at these companies to promote intrin-
sic motivation and to facilitate external motivation. In
particular, the following recommendations could be
drawn from our results:
1. A greater degree of information and pressure
on company owners and directors regarding
their responsibilities, for example, through doc-
umentation directed at these groups, via third
parties (the government, chambers of com-
merce) and even publicizing legal sanctions.
While this strategy directly tries to promote in-
ternal motivation, by increasing the possibility
of damaging a company’s image, it will also fa-
cilitate external motivation through the value
chain (as client/provider owners and directors
will be more sensitive to ORP management) and
increasing the fear of sanctions. The first part of
this strategy could also be used by an external
ORP consultant, directly or indirectly reaching
the first line of management.
2. Another possibility is to encourage internal
motivation by making a case for the financial
argument. This could be directly achieved by
introducing experience rate premiums,10 so the
insurance company would not only guaran-
tee disability coverage for workers but would
also promote greater risk prevention on the
part of employers (Wright & Marsden, 2002).
This strategy could be implemented also in-
directly, trying to show the financial bene-
fits of ORP management; while this kind of
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general approach seems to have been unfruit-
ful, it could be successfully used in specific in-
tervention programs, particularly when those
interventions lie in the field of ergonomics, as
many of the occupational injuries are related to
the musculoskeletal system (for example, the of-
ficial accident records for 2006 in the construc-
tion industry in Catalonia show that 31.5% of
the accidents were overexertion injuries).
3. When strategies addressed to improve intrin-
sic motivation seem difficult to implement, or
simultaneously with those, it is possible to fa-
cilitate extrinsic motivation. This seems to be
easier to achieve in companies showing a high
perception of occupational risks, while in the
rest of the companies it seems better to facili-
tate extrinsic motivation by formal or informal
agreements, through the value chain or with
worker’s representatives (as happens with fig-
ures such as local trade union representatives).
This kind of approach seems also natural when
implementing participatory programs.
Finally, the procedure that we develop in this article
could be easily applied and adapted by researchers and
technicians working for the government, persons with
responsibilities in ORP management, and consultants.
Although further research is needed to test the valid-
ity of our conclusions to other industries or contexts,
every effort will surely result in an improvement of oc-
cupational risk management, the health and safety of
workers, companies, and the society.
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Endnotes
1. It is important to point out that Hafel et al. have car-
ried out a qualitative study of business owners and
managers‘ perception of costs associated with acci-
dents and work-related illnesses. These authors con-
clude that economic arguments, at least in Europe,
have little weight in managers’ motivation for safety
and recommend using alternative criteria (similar to
those proposed by M. Wright).
2. Miller and Haslam have also done qualitative re-
search on the topic on the basis of in-depth in-
terviews of health and safety professionals in large
companies. Their conclusions are similar to those of
Hafel and others, although Miller and Haslam see an
opportunity to develop the relationship between pro-
ductivity and workers’ well-being.
3. For example, on the specific nuances in the transpo-
sition of the directive, those are allowed by the Euro-
pean Law, particularly depending on size and indus-
try. Nevertheless, Vogel (1998) remarks that while in
the majority of the European countries their transpo-
sitions include the aim to improve existing situations,
in a few countries (United Kingdom and Finland),
it has been a clause stating that this improvement is
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to be made up to the reasonably practicable (in the
United Kingdom) or necessary (in Finland).
4. In Spain, the ratio of the number of workers by in-
spector rates among the highest of the European
Union according to Arco and Galindo (2006), which
give a rate of 23,000 workers/inspector for Spain,
while the mean of this ratio for the EU countries
is 12,000. The consequent probability of an inspec-
tion visit, that according Wright is low in the UK
construction industry, can be very high in other
countries; for example, in Finland, weekly safety in-
spections are mandatory by law at every construction
site (Laitinen, Marjama¨ki, & Pa¨iva¨rinta, 1999).
5. What follows is a naive expectation, given that in
Spain it is mandatory by law to make an inspection
if a company has suffered a severe or fatal accident
(which can trigger several more visits, accompanying
police or forensic authorities to determine legal
responsibilities). Here bias-corrected inspection
rates are computed assuming a Poisson distribution
with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (be-
tween brackets) and with firm size as a four-level
factor.
6. The latter assertion may be because in the construc-
tion sector most accidents are individual in nature
(Reason, 1997), rather than organizational (as in
the case of the nuclear, chemical, and air-transport
sectors). When talking only of occupational acci-
dents, the majority of them affect only one worker.
and in the case of affecting more than one, two, or a
maximum of a small team of workers are affected (we
don’t have exact data but, in Catalonia in 2006, the
official records of injuries suffered by construction
workers shows that 13 fatalities correspond to
accidents affecting more than one person).
7. Specific actions addressed to SMBs have been
undertaken by 14 of the actual 23 European
countries that issued health and safety strategies
following the Council Resolution, among them
Spain and Great Britain (the majority of the other
nine are Nordic countries, with a consolidated and
efficient treatment of ORP, for example, Finland).
Construction lies among the sectors qualified as
“high risk” by Council Resolution 2007/C 145/01.
8. These companies are mutual funds that collaborate
with the Social Security.
9. A legal disposition was issued on March 2010,
establishing premium reductions of up to a 10%,
relating them with previous incidence indexes. The
bigger part of the burden is externalized to the
worker and its relatives, and we do not know any
system economically recognizing this burden.
10. Care should be addressed to the exact system (see
the previous discussion on this issue), as it seems
that systems in which premiums are related to cash
benefits are seen as most effective than systems in
which premium discounts are related to past indexes
of incidence, as has been recently established in
Spain (the disposition is very new, so we will have to
wait to estimate its real impact).
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